At a point in time, less than ten years from now, the blockchain subsidy will lower below one BTC and persist in the downtrend at each subsequent halving; this will indicate that the protection of the protocol will depend more on exchange charges alone. Suppose the exchange charges need to be revised to maintain comprehensive and supply miner processes.
In that case, there might be a probability for those institutions in power to manage good hash rates to attack the protocol. This threat must be taken seriously and counter becoming complacent in that, somehow, BTC’s success is inevitable, needing no further struggle of our own.
Since the end of the Blocksize war in 2017, developments to the protocol have been tremendously challenging to implement because of an obsession with protecting the major chain. Focusing on its importance, skepticism toward a proposed development of BTC Core’s code is desirable and reasonable.
Despite that, limiting all proposals in the name of the protective code is counterproductive when a proposal impacts the protection of the protocol. Developers should operate as custodians targeting to perfect the protocol, other than gatekeepers who deteriorate it.
The Difficulties BTC will Soon Face
Like other networks, BTC will fossilize at some point; however, critical situations are crucial to counter before strengthening permanently. The first is the unpredictability that exchange charges will protect the protocol as block subsidies lower over time.
Secondly, associated indirectly with the first, is that developers without a territory to permissionless and smoothly develop a useful and fee-generating structure for the protocol. Finally, the miners’ ecosystem must be aggressive and broadly supplied to ascertain the protocol’s continuous protection.
It is obligatory for miners to look for smart energy sources, to be cautious in capital strategizing, and to uphold operational success. If there is adequate revenue to go around, all the impressive performance in the globe will be sufficient, and miners will be required to end operations and liquidate their ASICs.
The accumulative revenue of all miners through all operations in a given time has been mainly fostered by a block subsidy decaying exponentially. Therefore, the community developers have to assist in strengthening the protocol’s protection budget by formulating new methods to increase the revenue from exchange charges by operating to optimize the price of BTC in general or by finding other novel uses for miners.
The protocol’s value and protection are associated directly with its utilization, so the solution must involve raising BTC’s utilization.
Addressing Drivechain Criticism
The BTC group should not allow rivalrous initiatives. We should consolidate every good aspect of all other initiatives into the Bitcoin protocol. We should adopt privacy coins, attractive contracting coins, and other coins.
Since sidechains are not pilots for getting rich quickly, they introduce proper open-source coordination; consumers can offer great ideas for somebody else to build on without the doubt of losing the upside. All sensible solutions will compete for the attention of the customers based only on their usage. Any utilization of any initiative constructed on a sidechain would profit everybody who reserved BTC.
This sidechain would be a revenue source for the miners; thus, there are few tokens for miners to destroy them. In addition, all utilization of sidechain is willing, so customers can choose to credit their BTC realizing there is a hypothetical risk.